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Abstract
We present a stream cipher based on a chaotic dynamical system.
Using a chaotic trajectory sampled under certain rules in order to
avoid any attempt to reconstruct the original one, we create a binary
pseudo-random keystream that can only be exactly reproduced by
someone that has fully knowledge of the communication system pa-
rameters formed by a transmitter and a receiver and sharing the same
initial conditions. The plaintext is XORed with the keystream creat-
ing the ciphertext, the encrypted message. This keystream passes the
NIST’s randomness test and has been implemented in a videoconfer-
ence App for smartphones, in order to show the fast and light nature
of the proposed encryption system.
1 Introduction
Communications have gone into a revolution allowing faster trading,
exchanging of ideas and the massive creation of social relations world
wide. Unfortunately, security techniques have not been improved at
the same speed. Current applications for mobile, tablets, smartcards,
and other gadgets have considerabily increase the need for more band-
width and CPU power, meaning that encryption and security tech-
niques compete for these same resources. People have to choose be-
tween security or performance.
To create communication devices that are not only secure but have
also good performance, the focus of research in security for these de-
vices has shifted to the development of lighter and faster stream ci-
phers that require less CPU time. However, as less CPU consumption
implies less algorithmic operations in the architecture of the stream
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cipher, these class of ciphers were considered to be insecure, weaker
than the block ciphers [16]. For example, a bias on the well known
stream cipher RC4 was discovered in 2001 [2], allowing to be attacked
successfully in a polynomial time.
In this context the eStream project [3] was born in 2004. Its aim
was to give rise to a standardization of fast and lightweight stream
ciphers. After receiving several proposals and years of analysis, only
few of the original proposals were chosen to belong to the current
official eStream portfolio. These cryptosystem are: HC-128, Rabbit,
Salsa20/12 and SOSEMANUK in the software oriented category, and
Grain v1, MICKEY 2.0 and Trivium in the hardware oriented category
(see Ref. [3] and the reference therein).
In this manuscript, we propose a new approach for building stream
ciphers based on Chaos Theory and its well known confusion and dif-
fusion properties [4]. We propose a new fast and light stream ci-
pher, named Enigmedia, which is based on a hyperchaotic dynamical
system, a codifying method with a whitening technique and a non-
linear transformation in order to obtain a pseudo-random keystream
sequence with high performance. The message is XORed in one side
with the keystream, obtaining the ciphertext. As the method is deter-
ministic, this keystream can be generated in the other communication
side. Then, by XORing the same keystream one can recover the orig-
inal message.
One of the main feature of this cryptosystem is that the initial
conditions used by both transmitter and receiver do not need to be
equal, allowing the system to posses a random secret key. However,
in order to minimize the set-up call time, we impose that the initial
conditions for receiver and transmitter are equal. It implies that we
can not use another feature of this system: if an eavesdroper tries to
intercept the communication, both receiver and transmitter become
aware of that, as it happens in quantum cryptography [6].
In this work, we have shown that for the creation of a good pseudo-
random sequence, only a small number of integrations of the chaotic
systems are needed. That is the reason of why the Enigmedia cipher
is fast and light. This result is a consequence of the fact that chaotic
systems have an exponentially fast decay of the correlation. The used
system has a particular large exponential decay, since it is a higher
dimensional chaotic system with two positive Lyapunov exponents.
Additionally, two Lyapunov exponents make impossible to detect sig-
natures such as universabilities or initial condition accotation.
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We use the mutual information to show decay of correlation of two
points of the chaotic trajectory separated by a small time interval.
This time interval is used to sample the chaotic trajectory from which
we calculate the keystream. We show by using mutual information
that also the keystream behaves as on independent binary sequence.
If the mutual information between points (or samples) in a time-series
(or binary sequence) is zero, that means that that these time-series
(or binary sequence) behave as an independent random process.
To improve further the speed of our cipher, we expand the keystream
created by the high dimensional chaotic system, using a nonlinear
map. These longer sequences were shown also to pass the NIST’s
tests, which assure their random and independence nature.
Furthermore, we present a benchmark of the performance between
our encryption system and actual de facto standards in block and
stream ciphers, i.e., AES-128 and RC-4. Finally, we show how our im-
plementation for smartphones passes NIST’s randomness tests show-
ing the high quality of the keystream.
2 Communication Scheme and Arqui-
tecture
As a stream cipher, Enigmedia is a symmetric cryptographical system.
It means that emitter (Alice, A) and receiver (Bob, B) must share
the same key in order to encrypt/decrypt the message sent through
the communication channel. With these key or seed, both A and
B generates the same keystream. XORing this keystream with the
plaintext/ciphertext one obtain the ciphertext/plaintext as it is shown
in Figure 1.
Note that it is important not to repeat the same key because if
an eavesdrop (Eve, E) identifies the keystream, it could use this in-
formation to recover a message. In order to avoid this, we use a true
random number generator [18] to generate our initial conditions for
the chaotic trajectory. These systems use a nondeterministic source
of randomness and by using them we assure a key randomly chosen.
As all symmetric systems, it is required a secure channel to ex-
change the key between Alice and Bob [8]. In our implementation
for secure videoconference, we use a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
and electronic certificates for assuring authentication and secure key
exchange via assymmetric cryptography techniques.
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Figure 1: Communication Scheme. Both communication extremes must
share the same key in order to generate the same keystream for recovering
the original plaintext.
It is important to remark that this cryptosystem is implemented
in the higher layers on the OSI (Open System Interconnection) model
[11], this implies that:
I) The encryption does not depend on the physical medium of
the communication channel, i.e., radiowaves, electrical signals, optical
fiber, etc.
II) Data transmission is robust to noise because we use other pro-
tocols to assure quality of service and check errors. When these errors
are produced, information packets can be retransmitted or simply dis-
carded.
3 The Dynamical System
The dynamical system arises from a pattern formation model in a
convective pattern experiment [13]. The equation set models how
the dynamics of pattern evolves according to a control parameter,i.e.,
the heating from below in a convective cell. The equation set is the
following:
x˙ = y
4
y˙ = µx+ x(a(x2 + z2) + bz2)
z˙ = w (1)
w˙ = µz + z(a(x2 + z2) + bx2)
We use a < 0, b > 0, µ > 0 assuring the chaotic behaviour of the
trajectories [23].
The dynamical system used has some properties which makes it
specially interesting in cryptographical applications [6]. Most sig-
nificant are hiperchaoticity in the sense of Rssler [12] and the inner
symmetries that appear in the equation system. Another important
property is that it is not an attractor in the sense of Milnor [14], it is
a non-attractive set with a riddled basin [15]. In further sections we
describe why these properties are important for security.
4 Generating Sequences
Here we explain how a chaotic system such as in Eq.(1) can be used
for obtaining a pseudo-random sequence.
First of all, assume that an initial condition is randomly chosen as
explained in Sec. 2. From this seed we compute the trajectory using
a numerical method (for example Runge-Kutta 4th order). Then,
this trajectory is generated considering some integration time steps
δt. We sample this trajectory considering a certain number of steps
m. Let us consider for a time interval T0 = mδt. If we choose properly
this number of steps, temporal correlation between any two points of
the sampled trajectory will be low. Fig. 2 represents this sampling
process.
A special characteristic of chaotic systems is that the time T0 for
the correlation to decay to neglegible values is finite and short. If the
system being used is hyperchaotic, such as in Eq.(1) the speed for
the correlation decay is advantadgeously fast. In order to assure that,
we calculate the Mutual Information between 2 points separated by a
time interval T0 according to Abarbanel [17].
We use Mutual Information because it is a measure of the amount
of information that one random variable contains about another ran-
dom variable [19]. Consider the random variables X and Y with pos-
sible measurements x ∈ X and y ∈ Y and a joint probability mass
function (p.m.f.) p(x, y) with marginal p.m.f. p(x) and p(y), then
mutual information I(X,Y ) is defined by:
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Figure 2: We represent the sampling process. The blue line plots a trajectory
and dark steps show the samples “holded” for some time for illustrating
purpouses.
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
(2)
where the log is in base 2. Note that a mutual information of zero
means that no information about X can be learnt by the sole obser-
vation of Y .
In order to place this abstract definition to our work, given a tra-
jectory represented by s(t), we represent it by a discrete time-series
s(n), where n represents the number of integration steps. The set of
observations as X is replaced by s(n), whereas the set Y is replaced
by the “delayed trajectories” s(n+ T ). The average mutual informa-
tion between observations at n and n+ T ,i.e., the average amount of
information about s(n+ T ) when we observe s(n) is then:
I(T ) =
N∑
n=1
p(s(n), s(n+ T )) log
p(s(n), s(n+ T ))
p(s(n))p(s(n+ T ))
(3)
with I(T ) ≥ 0, according to [17].
For computing these probabilities we create an histogram for the
different possible values of the trajectory. We generate one of these
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Figure 3: Mutual Information for the delayed system. This result shows how
the system loose its autocorrelation with time. This plot provide us with
information about how to sample the system.
histograms per each n and n+ T in order to compute the joint distri-
bution. These histograms accumulate the values of the trajectories in
n and n + T . In this case, we simulate for several different trajecto-
ries generated from different initial conditions randomly chosen. The
value of I(T ) is shown in Fig. 3 as a function of T . Notice that for
small values of T , I(T ) can already be very low.
By sampling the trajectory for a T0 with I(T0) ≈ 0 the series of
sampled values are reasonably uncorrelated to each other, but the
distribution of the values will not be uniform. This happens because
as in most of the chaotic systems, there are certain regions in the
phase space more “visited” than others.
In order to obtain a uniform distribution and decrease further the
correlation, we apply a whitening process for destroying the spatial
correlation. It consists on binarizing the variable sampled respect to
the symmetry axis. Choosing the variable x as to be the one generating
the keystream, we consider the trajectory can be encoded by a ′0′ if
x < 0, and encoded by ′1′ if x > 0. Due to the inner symmetries of
the system in Eq.(1), the distribution of the trajectory points will be
the same in each side (when the number of samples are big enough
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Figure 4: We represent the whitening process. The blue line representing the
symbolic values of the keystream shows a possible transformation in order to
obtain an equally distributed amount of samples around the symmetry axis
from the sampled values (in dark color).
according to the central limit theorem). The fundamental idea behind
the whitening process is that we are creating an approximation to a
Markov’s partition of the sampled trajectory into a symbolic sequence,
as it is shown in Fig. 4.
Assuming that we are computing the trajectories in double for-
mat,i.e., 32 bit precision, we can model this process as a boolean
function which relates a 4 variable system of 32 bits each to one in-
formation bit, i.e., F : F4·32
2
→ F2
2
applied over the samples.
Therefore, we obtain the binary pseudorandom sequence, i.e., the
keystream.
If we calculate again the mutual information for this keystream,
interpreting s(n) in Eq.(3) to represent the binary symbol Xˆ and
s(n+ T ) the binary symbol shifted forward in time XˆT , and we com-
pare it with the mutual information of binary sequence generated by
rand() function in C with equiprobable 0s and 1s, we show in Fig.
5 that the mutual information of the binary keystream to the one
obtained from the random binary sequence as a function of T . The
similarities between both curves asserts the good statistical properties.
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Figure 5: Mutual Information for sampled system. Also we compare the
keystream generated by our proposed scheme with rand() C function.
We have chosen this function due to its very good statistical properties
of the proposed system. Notice, however, that this function has bad
cryptographical properties because numbers generated by rand() have
a comparatively short cycle, and the numbers can be predictable.
5 Experiments and Implementation
In cryptography, it is important to have both speed and security, oth-
erwise there is no reason to use a new system. The current standard
AES [1] has been tested since 90’s and its special designed hardware
chipsets are common in high-standing handheld devices to increase its
efficiency.
For improving the speed of the proposed cipher, we have used
an expanding nonlinear function based on the Baker’s Transforma-
tion [20] to expand the binary sequence generated with the system
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of Eq.(1). As a simple example of the concept, let be two sequences
such as (00, 11). We use a transformation or rule to expand them, for
example, (101010 − 001101). Then we use another transformation to
wrap them up (1011 − 1100). The final sequence is larger than the
initial ones, created by mixing and stretching the streams. Notice that
by using a folding operation we obtain a final sequence that is not a
one-to-one mapping from the initial ones, for more details see [24].
There are other stream ciphers which use similar techniques, such
as Rabbit stream cipher [21]. A set of libraries for implementing the
operations and numerical methods in order to assure portability be-
tween devices while keeping the speed have been developed.
In order to assure the portability of the new cryptosystem, it has
to run the same algorithm in different devices. We have used the
following devices and processors:
1. Samsung Galaxy S - ARM Cortex-A8 @ 1 GHz
2. Android TouchBook - ARMv7 OMAP3 @ 720 MHz
3. Notebook EeePC Asus - AMD C-60 APU @ 800 MHz
4. ThinkPad Lenovo - Intel Core 2 i3 @ 2 GHz
Benchmark shows how many CPU clock cycles per byte encrypted
( cycles
byte
) takes to implement Enigmedia in different architectures. In
this implementation, we do not parallelize processes and operations,
and we do not use SIMD operations, except in encryption rate speed
tests done for Samsung Galaxy S where we use Neon set operations.
Results obtained are shown in Table 5 where Enigmedia is compared
against AES-128 and RC4 with OpenSSL implementation, which en-
ables the use of dedicated hardware in most of laptops to improve the
performance of AES and RC4.
It is important to remark that even in this situation Enigmedia
uses at least one order of magnitude less CPU clock cycles than those
ciphers
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Processor Enigmedia Rate AES Rate RC4 Rate
ARM A8 1 GHz 2.33 cycles
byte
*** ***
ARM A8 1 GHz 11.00 cycles
byte
*** ***
ARMv7 720 MHz 4.80 cycles
byte
55.28 cycles
byte
20.79 cycles
byte
AMD C-60 800 MHz 2.95 cycles
byte
49.95 cycles
byte
7.56 cycles
byte
Intel i3 2GHz 1.77 cycles
byte
32.26 cycles
byte
10.92 cycles
byte
Futhermore, we have checked the randomness of our expanded
and wraped binary keystream with NIST’s tests [7], which is a bat-
tery of statistical tests to detect non-randomness in binary sequences
constructed using pseudo-random number generators. Some of these
tests check the characteristic functions, patterns and rare events which
should appear in random sequences. We use them as they are a nec-
essary, but not sufficient condition, to assure randomness. These tests
focus on a variety of different types of non-randomness that could exist
in a sequence. The 15 tests are:
1. The Frequency (Monobit) Test
2. Frequency Test within a Block
3. The Runs Test
4. Tests for the Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block
5. The Binary Matrix Rank Test
6. The Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test
7. The Non-overlapping Template Matching Test
8. The Overlapping Template Matching Test
9. Maurer’s ”Universal Statistical” Test
10. The Linear Complexity Test
11. The Serial Test
12. The Approximate Entropy Test
11
13. The Cumulative Sums (Cusums) Test
14. The Random Excursions Test
15. The Random Excursions Variant Test
A number of tests in the test suite have the standard gaussian nor-
mal and the χ2, or Pearson’s distribution, as reference distributions.
χ2 is used to compare the goodness-of-fit of the observed frequencies
of a sample measure to the corresponding expected frequencies of the
hypothesized distribution.
If the sequence under test is in fact non-random, the calculated
test statistic will fall in extreme regions of the reference distribution.
A P -value summarizes the value of these “tails” and helps us to know
if a long sequence is random or not. We can calculate this P -value as
given by:
P−value = igamc
(
9
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,
χ2
2
)
=
Γ(9
2
, χ
2
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)
Γ(9
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)
=
1
Γ(9
2
)
∫ ∞
χ2
2
e−tt
9
2
−1dt (4)
where igamc is know as the incomplete gamma function. As a rule of
thumb, if P -value ≥ 0.0001 the distribution is considered uniform.
The distribution of P -values is examined to ensure uniformity.
This may be visually illustrated using a histogram, whereby, the inter-
val between 0 and 1 is divided into 10 sub-intervals, and the P -values
that lie within each sub-interval are counted and displayed. We show
in Fig. 6 the P -value for the all the tests. As the keystream are sup-
posed to be random, then strange events should appear. Uniformity
on these results is shown by determination of a P -value correspond-
ing to the Goodness-of-Fit Distributional Test over all tests. This is
accomplished by computing:
χ2 =
1∑
i=0
(
Fi −
s
10
)2
s
10
(5)
where Fi is the number of P -values in sub-interval i, and s is the
sample size. Then the average P -value is calculated appling Eq.(4),
providing the value 0.27515. This value comes from statistical tests
over 800Mb from 1 seed of 252 bits, which is the keylenght of the
implementation. We have applied same tests in different sequences
obtained from random initial conditions obtaining similar results, and
validating the system.
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Figure 6: NIST’s tests results for 800 sequences of 1Mb each. The P -value is
obtained considering the results of all these tests. As the P -value ≥ 0.0001
we can consider that the sequences are pseudorandom.
In order to test efficiency of the proposed cipher Enigmedia im-
plemented also a videoconference application, which helps to measure
CPU consumption, speed, and how sensible are the encryption method
to the technical characteristics of the devices.
6 Conclusions
We present a light and fast cipher based on chaos. The idea is to
create a binary keystream by encoding a sampled chaotic trajectory
every time interval T0. This time is chosen in order to produce a sam-
pled trajectory that has very low correlation and a keystream that has
similar behaviour as a random independent process. The time inter-
val is the shortest time for which mutual information of the sampled
trajectory decays to close to zero values.
For a real application of our own theoretical ideas, we improve the
speed of the cipher by expanding the keystream using the help of a
nonlinear transformation. This final keystream has shown to pass the
NIST’s tests to assure its random and independent nature.
Finally, it is known that having a very good statistical properties
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is a necessary condition for a system to be secure, but it is far from
been a sufficient condition [8]. For example the linear congruential
generator (the rand() function provided by C) is not secure due to the
linearity of the generation process [8]. However, since our function
posses a high nonlinear component, we believe that our function is
also robust against the state of the art attacks on stream ciphers (as
the algebraic and correlation attacks [9, 10]). Moreover, the fact that
the states are updated by means of several realizations of an ODE
solver, makes us believe that a description of the system in terms of
near-linear boolean functions is not possible.
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